The purpose of this case note is to analyse critically the judgment of Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti, 7 and to consider its implications for the system of occupational health and safety in South Africa. In this analysis, the main question is whether or not section 35(1) of COIDA, 8 which excluded Mankayi from its scope of application, is constitutional. The contribution will analyse the decision of the Constitutional Court which dealt with the interpretation of section 100(2) of the ODIMWA 9 and section 35(1) of COIDA.
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As a precursor, it is important to provide an overview of the Mankayi case for the discussion that follows. This will be done by analysing important legislation which plays a key role in occupational health and safety. Secondly, the case note will examine the system of compensation under the occupational health and safety legislation. Thirdly, the case note will be preceded by a short discussion of jurisdiction and prescription. Thereafter a discussion of the Mankayi case follows. As a point of departure, it will be argued that the decision of the Constitutional Court has far-reaching implications for the future of occupational health and safety, and in particular for the employer's liability for occupational injuries and diseases in mines.
Brief overview of the Mankayi case
The Constitutional Court in Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti 11 pondered the issue of the mineworkers' right to compensation. Firstly, the Court had to consider the provisions of section 100(2) of ODIMWA, which excluded Mankayi from claiming benefits under COIDA. Secondly, the Court had to decide whether section 35(1) of COIDA 12 limits the right of mineworkers to recover damages for occupational injury sustained or disease contracted during the course of employment. 12 Section 35(1) COIDA states that no action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or death.
It is against this background and on this basis (as discussed above) that the Applicant (Thembekile Mankayi) challenged the findings of both the South Gauteng High Court 13 and the Supreme Court of Appeal 14 in which section 35(1) of COIDA was interpreted as extinguishing the mineworkers' common-law right to sue the employer for occupational injuries sustained and diseases contracted during the course of employment, while protecting the employer against claims arising from non-compliance with the common-law duties of the employer, such as the duty to provide a safe working environment.
Judge Boshoff, in Van Deventer v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 15 summarised an employer's duty as follows:
An employer owes a common law duty to a workman to take reasonable care for his safety. The question arises in each particular case what reasonable care is required. This is a question of fact and depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. A master [employer] is in the first place under a duty to see that his servants [employees] do not suffer through his personal negligence, such as failure to provide a safe working environment and a failure to provide [a] proper and suitable plant, if he knows or ought to have known of such failure.
The MHSA further places a duty on an employer to provide a safe working environment, and this duty is subject to the concept "reasonably practicable", which is defined in the Act.
In terms of the MHSA, the employer at a mine being worked at must ensure safety at the mine without risk to the health of employees and persons who may be affected by the activities at the mine. The MHSA also states that the appointment of a manager does not relieve the employer of any duty imposed on him by the MHSA or any other law. Furthermore, if no manager is appointed, the employer must himself perform the functions of the manager. 
The facts
In the present case, the Applicant had been employed as an underground mineworker by the Respondent (AngloGold Ashanti Limited) for 16 years from 1979 to 1995. In his particulars of claim the Applicant alleged that during his employment the Respondent had negligently exposed him to harmful dusts and gases as a result of which he contracted diseases in the form of tuberculosis and chronic obstructive airways disease, which had rendered him unable to work as a mineworker or in any other occupation.
After being certified as suffering from a compensatable disease, the Applicant received R16 320.00 from the Compensation Commissioner in terms of ODIMWA. In enforcing his common-law right, the Applicant issued summons against the Respondent. He claimed damages in the sum of about R2.6 million. This comprised past and future loss of earnings of R738 147.14, future medical expenses of R1 374 600.00 and general damages of R500 000.00 (which included pain and suffering).
In the light of the above facts in the Mankayi case, both the High Court and the and the abrogation of the common-law right of action envisaged by section 35(1) of
COIDA.

2.2
The decision of the Constitutional Court: Some preliminary remarks on prescription and jurisdiction
Prescription
In the Mankayi case the Court was silent on the Prescription Act. 16 However, it is important to give a brief overview of some of the relevant provisions of the Act which have some relevance to this case. The Prescription Act has the effect of extinguishing a debt after the lapse of a specified period. A debt in the context under discussion refers to the Applicant's claim for damages. The relevant period in this regard is three years. 17 The question often arises when prescription commences. Must a plaintiff know all the facts on which his/her claim is based before prescription commences? Section 12 of the Prescription Act provides that prescription shall commence to run "as soon as the debt is due". 18 However, if the defendant (a debtor) wilfully prevents the plaintiff (a creditor) from coming to know of the existence of the debt (the claim), prescription shall not commence to For the purposes of the Act, the term "debt due" means a debt, including a delictual debt, which is owing and payable. A debt is due in this sense when the creditor acquires a complete cause of action for the recovery of the debt, i.e. when the entire set of facts which the creditor must prove in order to succeed with his or her claim against the debtor is in place or, in other words, when everything has happened which would entitle the creditor to institute action and to pursue his or her claim.
Even though the Constitutional Court was silent on the issue of prescription, it is clear that the Mankayi case falls within the statutory confines of the Prescription Act, because the Applicant in his particulars of claim alleged that in 1993 and in 1999 he was diagnosed as suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and that in August 2006 he was informed that he had contracted silicosis and obstructive airways disease. In my opinion, the discussion on the Prescription Act gives some guidelines on the time frames required by our law for a party to institute a claim against an employer.
Jurisdiction
The Constitutional Court was called upon to decide if it had jurisdiction to entertain this matter. In analysing the question of jurisdiction, the Court remarked that in a system of constitutional supremacy it is inappropriate to construe the concept of what is a "constitutional matter" narrowly. According to the Court, a constitutional matter involves the following:
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(a) the interpretation, application or upholding of the Constitution itself, (b) the development of (or the failure to develop) the common law in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, (c) a statute that conflicts with a requirement or restriction imposed by the Constitution, (d) the interpretation of a statute in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (or the failure to do so), (e) the erroneous interpretation or application of legislation that has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right or in compliance with the legislature's constitutional responsibilities, or (f) executive or administrative action that conflicts with a requirement or restriction imposed by the Constitution.
In addition, as Khampepe J remarked, it is in the interest of justice that an authoritative interpretation be given to a statutory provision that is claimed to curtail an employee's common-law right to recover compensation for the harm transformation from a formal, positivistic vision of law to a substantive, natural law vision of law.
2.3
Analysis of and comment on the Mankayi case In justifying the conclusion it reached, the Court premised its argument on section 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides that a court must, when interpreting any legislation, promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Furthermore, the Court also considered the impact of section 100 (2) of ODIMWA on the definition of "employee" and the use of that word in section 35(1) of COIDA which provides:
… substitution of compensation for other legal remedies ... No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on the part of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or death.
What is striking in this provision is that there is no reference at all to ODIMWA, notwithstanding the fact that COIDA was enacted more than twenty years after ODIMWA. Had the legislature intended for ODIMWA to entitle employees to be covered under COIDA, it would have been easy for it to have included references to ODIMWA, but it has not done so.
It is, of course, important to be attentive to the precise language of the provision.
What section 35(1) does in terms of the Court's interpretation is twofold. Firstly, it expunges the common-law claims of employees against the employer and, secondly, it limits an employer's liability to pay compensation save for under the Act. It expressly states that no liability for compensation on the part of such an employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act.
It limits the employer's liability to pay compensation to liability under COIDA alone.
That, in the Court's view, is an indication that both parts of the provision apply only to those employees covered by "the provisions of this Act"; namely, COIDA. Secondly, the Court emphasised that, if the language of section 35(1) is unclear, this Court would be entitled to have regard to the heading to determine its meaning. However, in the Court's view the language is clear, even without the heading. Section 35 (1) substitutes COIDA compensation for other legal remedies and no more. Neither this provision nor any other in the relevant statute refers to compensation under
ODIMWA.
According to the Court, the compensation provisions of ODIMWA and COIDA are separate but contiguous. While section 100(1) of ODIMWA precludes "double- This decision by the Constitutional Court imposes a duty on courts to ensure that, when faced with the task of developing common law, they do so in line with the Constitution. 33 The Court's decision moreover imposes a duty on the courts to give effect to the tenets of the Bill of Rights. The Court developed the common-law rule in this decision, which resulted in the Respondent being made liable for the damages as a result of the exposure by the Applicant to harmful dusts and gases in consequence of which he contracted diseases in the form of tuberculosis and chronic obstructive airways disease, which have rendered him unable to work as a mineworker or in any other occupation.
The importance of this decision is extensive. It will surely change the way in which the courts deal with cases relating to compliance with occupational health and safety laws. It also deals successfully with the right to the freedom and security of a person as enshrined in the Constitution. 
The protection of mineworkers against occupational injuries and diseases in South Africa
There are various sources which regulate occupational injuries and diseases. The
International Labour Organisation has a number of conventions concerning employment injuries and diseases. 37 In South Africa a constitutional imperative regarding occupational health and safety exists. 38 Collective agreements can also contain arrangements relevant to social security and health and safety at the workplace.
The primary legislation in South Africa which provides for preventative measures are It is also important to note that the OHSA and the Mines Health and Safety Act are aimed at ensuring the health and safety of employees at the workplace. In essence, these statutes serve a truly preventative purpose in the sense that they strive to prevent the contraction of diseases or injuries by employees. Similarly, COIDA and ODIMWA deal with the aftermath of injury or disease, i.e. the payment of compensation to the injured employee.
The purpose of workers' compensation legislation was pointed out by Price J in R v Canquan 44 when he remarked:
[Such legislation] is designed to protect the interests of employees and to safeguard their rights, and its effect is to limit the common-law rights of the employers and to enlarge the common-law rights of employees. The history of social legislation discloses that for a considerable number of years there has been progressive encroachment on the rights of employers in the interests of workmen and all employees. So much has this been the purpose of social legislation that employees have been prevented from contracting to their detriment. They have been prohibited from consenting to accept conditions of employment which the legislature has considered are too onerous and burdensome from their point of view. It is common that in most social security systems, even where a completely unified scheme for disability exists, a separate and more favourable scheme for industrial injuries is often retained. Occupational injury and disease benefits are not simply granted or allocated; they are bought through insurance contributions. Employees make available their labour to the employer who benefits from it financially. It is therefore accepted that the responsibility of financing such an insurance scheme rests with employers. In return, a statutory provision, such as section 35 of COIDA, replaces an employer's delictual liability towards the employee with insurance cover.
Comparison between COIDA and ODIMWA on the levels of compensation
The comparison between ODIMWA and COIDA compensation is aimed at proving that a person compensated under COIDA for an occupational disease is in a much better position than another person suffering from the same disease but who is compensated under ODIMWA. The Court, before coming to its conclusion, first compared the compensation payable under COIDA and ODIMWA respectively.
In terms of COIDA, an employee who suffers from an occupational disease is entitled to compensation in terms of Chapter VII of COIDA, which is headed "Occupational diseases". 46 However, this Chapter does not exclusively concern itself with the mechanism for compensation, but sets out general principles. Section 65 (6) of COIDA provides that the sections of COIDA regarding an accident apply "mutatis mutandis" to any occupational disease in relation to which there is a right to compensation in terms of COIDA. 47 It is therefore necessary to revert to Chapter VI of COIDA, which is concerned with compensation for accidents. The court used the term "occupational disease" as used in Chapter VII. Employees who suffer from occupational diseases are not compensated in respect of the disease itself but for The Court also commented on the enhanced compensation for which section 56 of COIDA provides where an employee contracts an occupational disease due to the negligence of the employer or other specified categories of related persons.
ODIMWA has no comparable provision. 67 This leaves those entitled only to ODIMWA compensation at a severe disadvantage. The argument that section 35(1) must be interpreted to exclude mineworkers' common-law claims so as to create a just and sensible parity in the two statutes' compensation systems is thus without merit.
In its conclusion the Court held that section 35 (1) ODIMWA. The category of employees who fall within the ambit of section 100(2) is limited to those who claim under ODIMWA on the ground that they were employed at a controlled mine or a controlled works. In respect of tuberculosis ODIMWA deems risk work at any mine or works to be risk work performed at a controlled mine or works. The extent to which employees have to rely on the fact that they were employed at a controlled mine or works in order to be entitled to benefits is further not clear from the wording of ODIMWA.
The significance of Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 2011 32 545 (CC)
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Mankayi case deemed to be relevant to the system of occupational health and safety based on the following reasons. Firstly, the Constitutional Court has developed a precedent to determine the content and meaning of the employer's duty of care. Phrased differently, there are yardsticks or standards of conduct against which the employer's conduct can be measured and judged. This judgment will instil some sense of accountability in employers who have exploited workers working under horrendous conditions for many years. Secondly, the judgment indicates that it is time the mines are taken to task about their responsibilities for the health and safety of employees in the workplaces. Lastly, the Mankayi case illustrates the difference in compensation that is being paid to employees suffering from the same occupational diseases. In short, it can be argued that the Mankayi case is the Court's latest and most promising innovation in the area of occupational health and safety.
In addition, in most civil-law jurisdictions the common-law duty of care is constantly being refined and given meaning and content by the courts through their judgments (as discussed above). 68 In most countries the legislature has further refined the employer's duty of care by enacting health and safety legislation. In general, health and safety legislation is intended to give specific content to the duty of care, and to enhance accountability by providing for a range of additional criminal and administrative sanctions.
One of the criticisms levelled against this decision by the Constitutional Court is that this case will open the floodgates to many cases against the employers. However, in my opinion this decision of the Constitutional Court has the potential to achieve legislative change, in particular with regard to the protection of miners and ex-miners against occupational injuries and diseases. This resonates well with the constitutional provision which affords everyone the right to a healthy environment.
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The right to a healthy environment was first explicitly recognised as a non-binding Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration established a further foundation for linking human rights and environmental protection, declaring that Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 68 The employer's duty of care in South Africa is the only mechanism whereby employers who breach the duty of care owed to their employees can be held accountable through a system of administrative sanctions regulated by the inspectorate and the criminal justice system. The civil justice system has no role to play. Indeed, it is expressly excluded. 69 Section 24 Constitution. S 24(a) affords everyone the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being. In deciding this case, the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court held that the member states must ensure appropriate protection of life, health, family, private property, and the human right to a healthy, viable and decent environment. In the second case of Tatar v Romania, 71 which arose in the aftermath of an ecological disaster at a gold mine in Romania which resulted in high levels of sodium cyanide and heavy metals being released into fresh waters, the water caused pollution and local residents were affected. The court in its decision held that the government must take action to adopt reasonable and adequate measures capable of respecting the rights of individuals against serious risks to their health and well-being.
The implementation of occupational health and safety standards in the workplace has been a subject of debate at an international level. To begin with, South Africa has ratified two key conventions relating to safety and health: the Safety and Health 
Conclusion
In The above analysis has endeavoured to show the role that the Constitutional Court has played in protecting miners against occupational diseases. For that reason it is argued that the Constitutional Court has developed a precedent to determine the content and meaning of the employer's duty of care. This means there are yardsticks or standards of conduct against which employers' conduct can be measured and judged. This judgment will instil accountability in employers who have exploited workers for many years by expecting them to work under horrendous conditions. Secondly, the judgment indicates that it is time that mine owners were held to account for their responsibilities for the health and safety of their employees in the workplace.
78 Kinley and Joseph 2002 Alt LJ 7-10. In addition, in most civil-law jurisdictions the common-law duty of care is constantly being refined and given meaning and content by the courts through their judgments (as discussed above). 79 In most countries the legislature has further refined the employer's duty of care by enacting health and safety legislation. In general, health and safety legislation is intended to give specific content to the duty of care and to enhance accountability by providing for a range of additional criminal and administrative sanctions.
The judgment has attracted various criticisms. The critics of the Court charge it with "opening the flood gates" to cases against employers. However, there is a threefold answer to these critics. Firstly, this judgment, it is submitted, is groundbreaking in that it has paved the way for mineworkers to seek justice outside of the failed compensation system. Secondly, the decision of the Constitutional Court provides us with an opportunity to fight the legacy of asbestos and silicosis that has left a trail of health and death threats in our communities. Thirdly, the Mankayi case also highlights the lopsided nature of the workers' compensation laws in South Africa, which lean towards compensation and place little focus on human rights. On a positive note, the Mankayi judgment places a duty on the employer to implement numerous good practice solutions which will enhance safety in the workplace.
In conclusion, the Mankayi case illustrates an inherent gap in the system of occupational health and safety in South Africa. The Committee of Inquiry into a National Health and Safety Council concluded that the system of compensation under COIDA and ODIMWA has not maximised its potential to promote preventative activities. 80 Even though it is more cost effective to run an effective rehabilitation scheme than to pay long-term cash benefits to victims of occupational accidents or diseases, reintegration measures are not being sufficiently addressed by the relevant South African legislation. 81 It is evident that there is a need for a unified system 79 The employer's duty of care in South Africa is the only mechanism whereby employers who breach the duty of care owed to their employees can be held accountable. In practice it is through a system of administrative sanctions, regulated by the inspectorate and the criminal justice system, that the employer can be held accountable for non-compliance with his common law duties. The civil justice system has no role to play. Indeed, it is expressly excluded. 80 Olivier Social Security 491-499. 81 COIDA requires that the employer must pay the compensation due to the injured employee for the first three months of temporary total disablement (s 47 (3)). This could perhaps be seen as a measure which will ensure to some extent the continuation of the employee's link with his which will address issues of occupational health and safety in a coordinated and unified manner.
employment. However, this remains essentially a temporary measure which is not backed by other (re)integration measures.
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